A New Lunar Order: China, the United States, and the Emerging Frameworks of Lunar Governance
By John Cruise | Edited by Galia Lavi
China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) has substantially expanded the role of commercial competition within its manned lunar exploration program in an effort to accelerate development. Critical systems, including the crewed lunar rover and lunar surface-sensing satellites, were announced to be already underway through competitively awarded contracts.
Beyond its symbolic importance, the return and sustained presence of humans on the Moon serves as both a major technological demonstration and a gateway to valuable resources. The Moon contains water ice that can be harvested and processed into drinking water, oxygen, and hydrogen, with the latter two also usable as a highly efficient rocket propellant. It also contains significant deposits of helium-3, which is extremely rare on Earth and could potentially be used to power nuclear reactors. These and other lunar resources could support the development of lunar bases, enable deep-space missions launched from the lunar surface, or be transported back to Earth.
China’s official government roadmap explicitly states the goal of landing two taikonauts (Chinese astronauts) on the Moon by 2030. The International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) cooperation framework, launched jointly by China and Russia in 2021, has since expanded to include a total of 13 member countries, including Egypt, Pakistan, Belarus, and South Africa. By 2035, Beijing plans to begin constructing a permanent lunar station. China has also proposed the “555 Project”, which aims to involve 50 countries, 500 international scientific research institutions, and 5,000 overseas scientists in the ILRS initiative. Together, these steps outline a clearly defined roadmap for China’s planned lunar presence.
Meanwhile, NASA’s Artemis program also aims to establish a long-term human presence on the Moon, supported by the Gateway, a planned space station in lunar orbit. The Artemis Accords, originally signed by eight nations in 2020, provide the international framework supporting these ambitions, and today more than 60 countries, including the United Kingdom, Japan, France, India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel, have joined the agreement. Despite the broader coalition compared to the ILRS, future lunar governance appears nonetheless to be consolidating around two distinct emerging frameworks.
In practice, however, the Artemis program has encountered multiple delays. Most notably, SpaceX’s Starship HLS, the lunar-lander variant of the Starship spacecraft and a core component of the program, has yet to demonstrate operational capability. In late October, U.S. Secretary of Transportation and acting NASA Administrator Sean Duffy underscored the urgency of sustaining momentum amid intensifying strategic competition with China and signaled that NASA has begun exploring new contracts with additional aerospace companies to address these setbacks. In addition, the proposed 2026 NASA budget cuts could reshape the program’s priorities by restricting funding for some of its key endeavors.
The Artemis II mission is scheduled for early 2026 and will mark the first crewed journey to the Moon since the end of the Apollo program in 1972, though it will only conduct a flyby. The crewed lunar landing, Artemis III, is targeted for mid-2027 at the earliest.
These developments illustrate a rapidly intensifying contest for leadership beyond Earth. Beijing is advancing its vision through the ILRS framework, while Washington leads its own coalition through the Artemis Accords. The growing alignment around these competing blocs suggests that a new space race may be emerging.
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