What Do Strikes on Iran Mean for China, Russia, and North Korea?
A sudden strike on Iran tests its ties with Russia, China, and North Korea. Will this crisis push them closer or expose deep rifts in their uneasy alignment?
Sources
CSIS (25.06.30)
Key Takeaways
Russia and Iran have strengthened ties significantly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with Iran supplying drones, missiles, and expertise in sanctions evasion. However, this partnership remains constrained by deep historical mistrust, ongoing espionage between the two, and differing visions for the future world order. While the two countries signed a strategic partnership treaty in early 2025, it notably excludes a mutual defense clause, highlighting Russia’s caution. Russia’s reluctance to fully support Iran during the recent strikes is rooted in its overstretched military capacity, declining arms exports, and its need to maintain relationships with other Middle Eastern states, particularly Israel. Domestically, Russian public opinion does not yet restrict the Kremlin’s decisions but could become a factor if the economic or human costs increase.
China’s relationship with Iran is driven mainly by economic and energy interests. Iran exports most of its oil to China and relies heavily on it for trade, creating a strong but imbalanced dependency. China has avoided supplying major weapons systems to Iran in recent decades, focusing instead on dual-use goods that support missile development under the radar. In response to the recent strikes, China emphasized maintaining regional stability and protecting energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, while publicly criticizing the US. Chinese domestic opinion appears generally supportive of Iran as an anti-US partner, though China ultimately prioritizes avoiding destabilization that could threaten its broader economic interests in the region. Despite occasional signals of deeper ties, China remains hesitant to act as a crisis player in military confrontations.
North Korea and Iran share a long history of missile cooperation dating back over four decades, with Iran’s Shahab missile series directly based on North Korean designs. This relationship has included scientific exchanges and support to Iran’s proxies. North Korea operates tactically and opportunistically, exploiting opportunities without much external constraint. While North Korea has been more focused on its growing relationship with Russia, it remains a potential source of missile and possibly nuclear support for Iran if tensions escalate further. North Korea’s ability to act freely and supply sensitive capabilities without attracting immediate global scrutiny makes it a particularly disruptive actor within this network.
All three countries—Russia, China, and North Korea—prefer to avoid a full-scale regional war or the collapse of the Iranian regime. They see value in Iran remaining stable yet dependent. However, the strikes on Iran highlight limitations in Russia and China’s willingness to provide overt military support, suggesting that North Korea could become Iran’s fallback option for advanced weaponry or even nuclear assistance. This dynamic exposes the so-called "CRINK" grouping as more of an opportunistic alignment than a cohesive alliance.
The recent events also underscore broader concerns about the erosion of global norms against the use of force. The strikes risk encouraging future unilateral actions by other states, including potential implications for Taiwan and beyond. North Korea, in particular, may view the strikes as further justification for retaining its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent and could leverage the crisis to engage in tactical diplomacy or extract concessions. Overall, these developments illustrate the fragile, transactional nature of these partnerships and the dangerous potential for deeper destabilization if tactical cooperation morphs into strategic alignment.
AI Summary
I. Russia–Iran Relationship
Russia and Iran share anti-Western views and see themselves as pariahs in the global system.
Relationship strengthened post-Ukraine invasion; Iran provided drones (Shahed-136), missiles, and expertise in sanctions evasion.
Russia supplies Iran with cereals, machinery, wood, and industrial goods.
January 2025 treaty between Russia and Iran lacks a mutual defense clause, indicating caution.
Deep historical mistrust persists, rooted in past conflicts over the Caucasus, Caspian region, and WWII occupations.
Both sides actively spy on each other; they do not share an identical vision for a future world order.
Russia’s Middle East interests are diverse; maintains ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Russia’s weapons exports have declined since the Ukraine war, affecting ability to support partners.
Russia avoids direct military support to Iran to preserve other regional relationships, including with Israel’s leadership and Russian-speaking communities there.
Domestic public opinion in Russia is not a strong constraint yet but could become so if economic hardship or direct war mobilization affects ordinary people.
II. China–Iran Relationship
Primarily economic and energy-based; Iran exports about 90% of its oil to China.
Iran heavily relies on China for trade (about one-third of imports and exports), creating an imbalance.
China gets 13–14% of its crude oil from Iran, often through intermediaries.
Past missile and air defense technology transfers in the 1980s helped Iran develop indigenous capabilities.
China currently avoids providing direct military systems but offers dual-use goods like ammonium perchlorate (missile fuel).
Chinese companies sanctioned by the US for supplying missile-related materials.
China’s official reaction focused on avoiding regional instability, particularly protecting the Strait of Hormuz for energy flows.
China publicly criticizes US as a destabilizing force but pressures Iran to avoid closing the Strait.
China prioritizes self-preservation, evacuating citizens and minimizing economic risks.
During crises, China’s ability to shape events is limited; it prefers stability to safeguard energy and economic interests.
Chinese netizens express some support for Iran, suggesting Iran might have performed better with Chinese weapons.
China's strategy is to maintain Iran as an anti-US partner while keeping Iran dependent on Chinese support.
III. North Korea–Iran Relationship
Over four decades of missile cooperation; Iran’s Shahab missiles derived from North Korean Scud and Nodong designs.
Cooperation includes possible long-range missile development and scientific exchanges.
North Korea has provided weapons to Iran and proxies (e.g., Hamas) in the past.
Concern over possible nuclear cooperation; rumors of simulation programs for warhead tests.
North Korea uses the relationship tactically and transactionally; long-standing cooperation gives it leverage.
Recent stronger North Korea–Russia ties overshadow Iran, reducing Iran’s relative importance to North Korea.
North Korea acts with few constraints, operating below international radar, and may exploit opportunities to supply missiles or help rebuild Iran’s air defenses or nuclear capabilities.
Russia and China might indirectly encourage Iran to approach North Korea for military needs they themselves avoid fulfilling.
IV. Reactions to Recent Strikes on Iran
Russia gave Iran rhetorical support but avoided military commitments; Russian UN statements warned of Pandora’s box but did not mention US or Israel directly.
Russia’s caution explained by resource constraints, desire to maintain ties with Israel, and not provoke escalation affecting its broader interests.
China focused on avoiding Strait of Hormuz closure and regional instability; official statements criticized US but also sought to limit Iranian retaliation.
China balances its interests across Gulf countries and Israel, avoiding deeper involvement in military conflicts.
North Korea remained publicly muted, signaling no major constraints but open to opportunistic military support if requested.
All three avoid regime collapse in Iran, viewing stability as preferable despite possible benefits from Iran’s dependence.
V. Broader Strategic and Governance Implications
Risk of Iran moving closer to North Korea for military and possibly nuclear support.
Potential erosion of global norms against the use of force; lessons for Taiwan and other future conflicts.
North Korea likely sees US strikes as confirming its choice to maintain nuclear weapons for deterrence.
Strikes might paradoxically open space for renewed US–North Korea talks as North Korea seeks insurance against similar actions.
Concern that North Korea could act as a spoiler, providing arms or nuclear assistance under the radar, while Russia and China focus on preserving plausible deniability.
VI. Future Signals and Indicators
China: Whether it crosses the line into overt military aid to Iran (e.g., air defense systems), or signs off on Chinese weapons transfers via third countries.
Russia: Provision of advanced systems (like air defenses) to Iran or deeper investment in Iran-linked infrastructure projects for sanctions circumvention.
North Korea: Moves to supply more missiles, help reconstitute Iran’s missile or air defense capabilities, or engage in nuclear cooperation.
Speakers
Victor Cha (President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair)
Mona Yacoubian (Senior Adviser and Director, Middle East Program)
Maria Snegovaya (Senior Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program)
Brian Hart (Deputy Director and Fellow, China Power Project)
Images on this site are licensed under Creative Commons (CC) or public domain, unless stated otherwise. Some images were generated using AI tools. See individual image attributions for details.